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Abstract 
The dominant understanding of Internet censorship posits that blocking access to foreign-based 
websites creates isolated communities of Internet users. We question this discourse for its 
assumption that if given access people would use all websites. We develop a conceptual framework 
that integrates access blockage with social structures to explain web users’ choices, and argue that 
users visit websites they find culturally proximate and access blockage matters only when such sites 
are blocked. We examine the case of China, where online blockage is notoriously comprehensive, 
and compare Chinese web usage patterns with those elsewhere. Analyzing audience traffic among 
the 1000 most visited websites, we find that websites cluster according to language and geography. 
Chinese websites constitute one cluster, which resembles other such geo-linguistic clusters in terms 
of both its composition and degree of isolation. Our sociological investigation reveals a greater role 
of cultural proximity than access blockage in explaining online behaviors.  
 
KEYWORDS:  censorship, China, Culturally Defined Markets, cultural proximity, audience 
duplication, access blockage, Internet, media choice, filtering, globalization  
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“A new information curtain is descending across much of  the world,” announced the U.S. 
secretary of  state Hillary Clinton in her speech on “Internet Freedom,” two months after attending 
the celebration to commemorate the fall of  the Berlin Wall (Clinton, quoted in Cramer 2013, 1077). 
Her statement illustrates the common understanding that state blockage creates isolated 
communities on the World Wide Web. Such claims are based on an assumption that Internet users 
would use all websites if  given access. On the contrary, a large body of  research on global cultural 
consumption shows that audiences prefer products that are closer to their culture, even when they 
have access to products from abroad. Hence, we advocate a framework that integrates access 
blockage with other social structures, such as language and geography, to explain web user choices. 
This framework treats online state censorship as a form of  cultural protectionism. 
To test this conceptual framework, we focus on China where Internet censorship is most 
developed and has garnered enormous attention internationally. We examine global patterns of  web 
usage to compare Chinese web usage with other regions not subject to state-imposed access 
blockage. First, we analyze traffic among the 1000 most visited websites globally, and discover that 
websites cluster according to geography and language into many culturally defined markets. The 
Chinese cluster is one such market, and we do not find it to be particularly isolated compared with 
other geo-linguistic clusters that take shape on the “open” Internets. Further, we examine the 
specific composition of  the Chinese culturally defined market, and find that blockage is a rather 
limited explanation for it. Finally, we speculate how Chinese Internet users’ behavior would change 
if  the Great Firewall of  China is lifted. 
Internet Censorship and the Internet in China  
China’s very first full-function linkage to the World Wide Web was realized in 1994, through 
a 64K international dedicated circuit provided by the Sprint Corp. of  the United States. The Chinese 
government began to regulate online content and services in 2000, when Internet access was still 
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confined to the elite strata in research institutes, state organs, and foreign companies (below 2% 
penetration rate). While strengthening ideological control over this new media, the state has also 
been taking an aggressive role in expanding internet infrastructures and information economy 
(Harwit and Clark 2001; Zhang 2006). Undergoing exponential growth, the size of  Chinese online 
population has reached 564 million and the number of  domestic websites 2.68 million by the end of  
2012 (CNNIC n.d.). This combination of  factors has resulted in China having the largest online 
population among all countries, a large and prosperous domestic Internet industry, and the most 
technically sophisticated Internet censorship.  
State censors act upon all types of  websites that they consider either violate social and moral 
norms (eg., sexually explicit content, see Jacobs 2012), or threaten the ruling power (Faris and 
Villeneuve 2008; Bamman, Brendan, and Smith 2012). Censorship is not restricted to news and 
political sites as users in nondemocratic regimes tend to engage with the seemingly “nonpolitical” 
realm in politically consequential ways. For instance, in China’s personal blogosphere, social media, 
and video sharing sites, users develop distinct styles to express political sarcasm and initiate civic 
discourse as spinoffs of  entertainment content. They also mobilize political protests using social 
networks established and maintained through leisure-oriented activities online, which makes any 
website with networking capacities potentially a target of  censorship (MacKinnon 2008; Marolt 
2011; Meng 2011; Xiao 2011; Yang 2009).  
Chinese Internet censorship includes two types of  measures: content censorship over 
domestic websites, and access blockage targeting websites outside the state’s jurisdiction. Regarding 
the first measure, content censorship, it needs to be noted that the domestic online landscape is not 
at all monolithic in terms of  ideology and information. To cope with the tremendous scale of  online 
content production, the state relies increasingly on private corporations to monitor their own turfs, 
leading to a domestic information regime under a largely decentralized and heterogeneous discipline 
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(MacKinnon 2009). Complex dynamics and vibrant user activities just discussed arise from this 
institutional arrangement – although censors watch over a wide range of  online venues, the users are 
creative at bypassing the radar. Moreover, the state actively fosters a freer domain where people can 
vent frustrations and have fun, and where it can observe public opinions and adjust local policies 
(Hassid 2012; MacKinnon 2011; Zheng 2007). A recent study shows that censors of  micro-blogs 
primarily expunge comments that “represents, reinforce, and spur social mobilization,” but are more 
likely to permit vocal discontent with the government (King, Pan, and Roberts, forthcoming).  
Despite all these ongoing contestations around content censorship in domestic cyberspace, 
public attention is overtly focused on the second measure of  state censorship, i.e., access blockage, 
which is also our focus in this study. First coined overseas, this gigantic filtering mechanism is now 
widely termed as “the Great Firewall of  China,” or the GFW (Barmé  and Ye 1997). The GFW 
allows regulators to prevent China-based Internet users to access targeted foreign websites through 
layers of  technical intervention (Feng and Guo, forthcoming).  
“Free Flow of Information,” Access Blockage, and User Preference 
In the US policy discourse on international communications, the GFW is often equated with 
a digital version of  the Iron Curtain that curbs the “free flow of  information” (Cannici 2009; Tsui 
2008). For example, as quoted in the opening, Hilary Clinton cautioned against “a new information 
curtain” that creates a vital “partition” on the global Internet (Clinton, quoted in MacKinnon 2011, 
32).  Terms such as “Chinternet,” which spread widely since Google quit China over censorship 
dispute in 2010, clearly communicate the perception of  the Chinese Internet as a distinct entity from 
the WWW as it is fenced in by a repressive regime (Chao and Worthen 2010; also see Mueller 2011).  
These policy and popular discourses often presume that the GFW stops the Chinese from 
joining the world, embracing values of  liberty and democracy, and thereafter pushing for 
democratization (Damm 2007; Tsui 2008). Sharing such beliefs, scholarly research documents in 
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detail how the Chinese struggle to breach the GFW (Harwit and Clark 2001; Mulvenon and Chase, 
2005; Xiao 2011). Inherent in this understanding are assumptions about Chinese users’ Internet 
browsing choices, namely the websites they would choose if  they were free to access what they 
wanted. In other words, the GFW is seen as preventing the Chinese from accessing foreign websites.  
Resonating with the Cold War metaphors used to describe Chinese Internet filtering, a study 
on how communism’s collapse affected international idea flows in Eastern Europe is particularly 
relevant. By measuring book translations before and after the collapse, it points out that the existing 
emphasis on state censorship in explaining low inflows of  Western information obscures the role 
played by audience preferences (Abramitzky and Sin 2010). In this vein, to what extent does the 
GFW impair agentive information retrieval on the part of  Chinese Internet users?  
In the Global Internet User Survey (Internet Society 2012), compared with individuals from 
19 other countries, the Chinese are not exceptional in their perceptions of  Internet control-related 
issues; moreover, they tend to see more positive consequences of  government regulations of  the 
Internet. In fact, various surveys have found that in China tolerance of  Internet censorship runs 
relatively high (Guo and Feng 2011; Li 2009). While censorship endorsement may result from 
certain cultural and historical factors, the fact that 89% (global average: 85%) of  Chinese Internet 
users agree or strongly agree that they “have full access to all of  the information that is available on 
the Internet” (Internet Society 2012, 20) suggest that the coercive impact of  the GFW upon 
Internet use patterns is overestimated. As some ethnographic research suggests, many Chinese 
people are either unaware of  the GFW, or unconcerned by it (Damm 2007, 282-285; F. Liu 2010). 
Therefore, the degree to which access blockage moderates the Chinese’ ability to enact their 
preferences on the Internet requires large-scale empirical investigation, particularly as more and 
more media products become increasingly available globally.  
Other than its presumptions about user preferences, we are also skeptical about the 
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obsession over state-imposed blockage in global Internet governance because we see it as stemming 
from the ideological underpinnings of  “free flow doctrine” initiated during the Cold War era 
(Nordenstreng 2011; Tsui 2008). Recent critical inquiries point to a problematic assumption of  this 
discourse – only political domination hinders the free access to information. Economic interests that 
prevail in formally democratic countries are also at work (Cramer 2013).  
In the same vein, we see state-imposed blockage like the GFW as infringing on people’s 
freedom regardless of  whether coercive prevention takes place. Internet governance should result 
from people’s democratic decision-making, not from the arbitrary power of  an authoritarian 
government. What we are against, fundamentally, is the Chinese users’ condition of  political 
subjection signaled by the operation of  the GFW, rather than the specific type of  interference it may 
have in people’s browsing practices (see Skinner 1988).  
In the following section we review related literature on global media consumption, and posit 
how access blockage combined with other cultural factors to explain Chinese web use patterns 
alongside the global ones.  
Global Internet Usage and Culturally Defined Markets 
The World Wide Web is conceived as an inherently global mass medium. Any user with 
access to an Internet enabled device, can potentially access the WWW regardless of  her location. 
Therefore, any attempt at restricting access to content on the WWW is seen as preventing users 
from accessing information. Such a claim assumes that people are equally predisposed towards all 
content available on the WWW.  Existing empirical studies suggest otherwise.  
For instance, analyzing structure of country to country hyperlinks between websites, Barnett, 
Chung and Park (2011) find that sites in the same languages or those that focus on the same country 
tend to have more hyperlinks with one another than with sites in different languages or focusing on 
other countries. In a large scale analysis of Wikipedia, Hecht and Gergle (2010) found that each 
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language Wikipedia differs from others in the concepts they cover as well as in the content of the 
common concepts covered. Likewise, Twitter ties form between people when they are in close 
geographic proximity, share the same language or when there is direct air connectivity between their 
locations (Takhteyev, Gruzd, and Wellman 2012). These findings indicate web users’ tendency to 
show a predisposition towards local content.  
In fact, not just web users but audiences across media, are predisposed towards local 
products. In general people prefer content that is in their own language, enjoy discussing it with 
their friends, and find it easier to derive meanings from local products than foreign products (Pool 
1977). This tendency of audiences to prefer content that is closer to their culture is termed as 
cultural proximity. We see cultural proximity in play when global media consumption in the 
aggregate manifests as many culturally defined markets (henceforth CDM) (Straubhaar 2007). Each 
CDM is a media market where the content and the audience share common cultural traits, such as 
shared language and geographic proximity. 
Language is one of the most obvious explanations for the formation of culturally defined 
markets (Straubhaar 2003) in part because large segments of audiences globally consume content 
mostly in languages they understand. Examples of such markets at the regional or transnational level 
include the Spanish speaking countries of Central and South America, mainland China and Hong 
Kong, Hindi/Urdu speaking (North) India and Pakistan, as well as much of the Arabic speaking 
Middle East (Curtin 2003; Straubhaar 2007). The different linguistic regions within Switzerland 
(German, French and Italian), India (Tamil, Telugu etc.) and Spanish speaking Hispanic audiences 
within United States (Ksiazek and Webster 2008) are examples of such markets within nation states. 
In other cases, CDMs are not geographically contiguous, e.g. the Portuguese speaking world (Brazil, 
Portugal, Mozambique, and other countries) or the English speaking world (US, Canada, UK, 
Australia, New Zealand, and other countries). 
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Other than language, the literature on cultural proximity also identifies geographical 
proximity between the place of production of media content and the audience under consideration 
as a factor.  With abundant national and regional content available to audiences around the world, 
studies show evidence of cultural proximity in Asian countries such as India (Neyazi 2010) and 
Korea (Jin 2007), in Latin American countries such as Brazil and Ecuador (Davis 2003), and in 
Middle Eastern countries such as Lebanon (Kraidy 1999). Not all countries have an adequate market 
size and/or the wealth to produce copious amounts of national programming. Under such 
circumstances, the thesis of cultural proximity posits that audiences will gravitate towards content 
from nearby regions (Straubhaar 2007).   
While language and geography are often correlated, since geographically contiguous regions 
tend to speak the same languages, CDMs also form when such regions do not share a common 
language. For instance Bollywood movies are quite popular in Afghanistan and much of the Arab 
World, even though Hindi (the language of most Bollywood movies) is neither spoken, nor 
understood in either of these countries. Another case in point is the Iberian Peninsula comprising 
Spain and Portugal. In such cases these territories share common histories of migration of ethnic 
groups, colonialism and cultural contact (due to geographical proximity, trade, etc.) (Straubhaar 
2007). 
Growth of CDMs is supported by policies of cultural protectionism practiced by many 
states, to preserve national cultures from foreign influence. Such policies largely involve two 
practices. First, many nation states impose quantitative restrictions on import of foreign content, 
such as setting quotas on number of foreign films or barring foreign television broadcasts during 
prime time. Second, states try to promote national production by offering subsidies and tax breaks 
to local culture industries (Baughn and Buchanan 2007). Initially protectionism did contribute to the 
growth of domestic cultural industries. However, in the last few decades, under the influence of 
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liberalized international trade regimes many states have lifted protectionist measures on cultural 
products (Burri 2012). Yet, media audiences continue to be more inclined towards culturally 
proximate products. 
Linking this well-established literature on cultural proximity in global media consumption to 
our current topic, we argue that people can enact their preferences much more easily towards 
culturally proximate content on the web. First, no regulatory clearances are needed to create Web 
pages in most countries, unlike television channels that require a broadcasting license or films that 
require clearances from censor boards or rating agencies. Second, the web provides many ‘platforms’ 
that allow ordinary users to share the content they have created, often with minimal resources, and 
upload it online. Hence it is possible to create, host, populate and popularize websites with 
minimum costs, if one has access to a computer connected to the Internet. Further, online content is 
usually free to consume for users browsing from any location unless the owner desires to restrict its 
access based on visitors’ specific territories, or certain countries block specific websites from 
domestic viewing, such as in the case of China.     
Internet Access Blockage and User Behavior 
Assuming that user behavior is driven by cultural proximity, we consider the impact of state 
censorship on online behavior to be analogous to that of cultural protectionism in traditional media. 
Both facilitate the formation of culturally defined markets. They achieve their effect in three ways. 
First, by definition, just as cultural import controls aim to restrict audience’s media diets to national 
products or imports allowed by the state, Internet access blockage too constrains users from 
browsing foreign websites and thus confines them within the domestic Internet landscape.  
More noteworthy, however, are the two indirect mechanisms by which the GFW accentuates 
the consumption of domestic websites. First, by blocking foreign sites, it acts like a trade barrier that 
enables growth of the domestic industry. The absence of foreign competition has clearly contributed 
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to the dramatic success of the Chinese versions of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, as well as the 
fast expansion of Chinese online service providers in general (C. Liu 2010). The Chinese users, as a 
result, are left to choose from a wide range of domestically available products. Second, state 
censorship also limits people’s knowledge about their media choices. Therefore, through altering the 
information milieu regarding media availability, the GFW may have shaped people’s browsing 
preferences without them noticing it (Webster 2011). Therefore, it is quite likely that GFW has 
facilitated the consolidation of a Chinese CDM by enabling a large and varied supply of local 
products, as well as habituating people’s preferences towards local products. 
We expect people on average to keep consuming local websites, even if the GFW is lifted, 
making accessible erstwhile blocked foreign sites. Domestic producers “have a distinct advantage in 
the competition for an audience” once they manage to re-appropriate popular cultural formats from 
abroad (Pool 1977: 143). Thus after a point when local content becomes widely available, it trumps 
foreign content for people’s attention. In addition, if the GFW does function largely through 
indirect mechanisms, as just discussed, Chinese are likely to continue their existing browsing patterns 
out of habit (Figure 1).  
To summarize, rather than assuming that people use indiscriminately all the websites they 
have access to, we believe that they mainly prefer culturally proximate websites on the global 
Internet. In this view, access blockage is coercive only when it prevents users to browse culturally 
proximate content. Moreover, by potentially assisting the growth of domestic content (both in 
Chinese and China-focused) and limiting people’s knowledge of foreign options, Chinese Internet 
censorship may have contributed to the formation of a CDM on the WWW. We further argue that, 
after a decade-long imposition, even if blockage is lifted today, Chinese users are unlikely to change 
their browsing behavior significantly (Figure 1). Any empirical exercise to explain Chinese web usage 
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must incorporate cultural factors such as language and geographical focus of content alongside state-
imposed access blockage, as we do in this study.    
Figure 1 about here 
Data, Measures, and Methods 
Audience Duplication  
Most media users today have at their disposal a large number of media options. Yet they do 
not consume all these options and focus on a small number of such subsets commonly termed 
“media repertoires” (Taneja, Webster, Malthouse, and Ksiazek 2012). These repertoires could be 
based on a number of factors such as users’ preferences and the platforms and content they are able 
to access. When analyzed in the aggregate, the composition of these repertoires indicates what media 
and/or content are consumed by the same audiences. Hence, in order to identify these repertoires 
we not only need to know how many people consume each media outlet, but how they move 
between different outlets. This information is often provided by a measure called audience duplication. 
Audience duplication is the extent to which two media outlets are consumed by the same 
audiences. For instance, on any given day, if out of 100 people in a population, 20 people watched 
both FOX News and CNN, the audience duplication between them would be 20% for that day. 
Likewise, duplication can be calculated for all possible pairs of media outlets for a given audience. 
This results in a symmetric audience duplication matrix, where the elements A i,j represent the extent 
to which media outlets i and j have audiences in common. Such a matrix can be analyzed further to 
identify clusters of media outlets that have audiences in common. The earliest application of 
audience duplication was in identifying user defined program types, the subsets of television 
programs that were watched by the same set of users (Webster 1985). Webster and Ksiazek (2012) 
have recently used audience duplication to study the repertoires of websites commonly used 
together by US Internet users. In this study, we use such an approach.  
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We obtained audience duplication figures between all possible pairs of most popular 
websites. In doing so, we define duplication between any two websites as the % of unique users that 
visited both websites across any possible pair. This reveals the extent to which audiences move 
between all pairs of websites irrespective of the languages and geographical focus (if any) of these 
websites The resulting audience duplication matrix can help investigate, whether WWW 
consumption clusters into culturally defined markets. Before detailing on those methods we describe 
our source for audience duplication data. 
Data: comScore 
In this study, we use data from comScore1, a panel based service that provides Internet 
audience measurement data once a month. It is currently the largest continuously measured audience 
panel of its kind. With approximately 2 million consumers worldwide in 170 countries under 
continuous measurement, the comScore panel utilizes a meter that captures behavioral information 
through a panelist’s computer. Data are collected from both work and home computers of the panel 
members. Complementing the panel is a census-level data collection method, which allows for the 
integration of the aggregate level Internet behavior obtained through servers with audience 
information gained through the comScore panel. 
ComScore organizes websites by Web domains and subdomains. We decided our sample to 
be the top 1000 Web domains (ranked by monthly unique users) in the world, as this number not 
only captures most of the domains that 99% of Web users visit, but ensures an adequate 
representation of sites in different languages and different geographies. For many large websites 
such as Google, the different geo-linguistic variants are classified as separate domains (e.g., 
www.google.es , www.google.de etc.).  For certain large domains such as Wikipedia, language 
versions are sub-domains of the main domain (e.g., es.wikipedia.org). In such cases, these sub-
domains have been considered in the final sample instead of restricting to top level domains. These 
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data reflect traffic during June 2012 and 973 websites were included in the final sample. These 
covered 50 languages in all (many sites were in multiple languages). For each one of the 973 
websites, we obtained its audience duplication with all other 972 sites. Thus the final dataset has 
472878 ((973 *972)/2) pairs of audience duplication numbers.  
We collected our censorship data in November 2012 from GreatFire.org, an online 
organization that shares real-time and historical information about GFW blockage since early 2011.2 
GreatFire allows users to access blockage records of thousands of websites it routinely monitor, as 
well as to test their own URLs. Given the ever adjusting nature of GFW, for the majority of our 
sample websites that have established GreatFire profiles (several tests per month), we code 
censorship data based on whether they had been blocked in the past 30 days; for the remaining 
fraction of websites not monitored by GreatFire, we tested them on the spot and noted the results 
(either blocked or not). A total of 99 sites were blocked across genres including 21 entertainment 
sites, 18 file and photo sharing services, 13 social media sites and 4 news sites and 2 portals. 
One of the authors visited each website and noted all languages each site offered content in. 
Additionally we relied on the self-description, metdata and third party sources (such as Alexa.com) 
to ascertain the geographic focus of the website. For about one third of the sites, where we could 
not assign a country we classify them as Global. Most of the sites that fall into the “global” category 
have subdomains that vary by language and at times have tailored content for different countries. 
Methods 
We used a number of analytical procedures on the audience duplication data. First, we 
analyzed the resulting audience duplication matrix using a set of network analytic tools. These 
suggested high evidence of underlying clusters of websites with highly duplicated audiences. Second, 
we conducted a hierarchical clustering of this matrix to identify these repertoires of websites 
commonly consumed together. These repertoires seemed well aligned to global Internet usage 
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patterned by the presence of CDMs. We found that a large number of websites focusing on 
mainland China constitute one such cluster. We examined the average distance of each of these 
clusters to the rest of the network to understand their relative isolation. Further, we examine the 
membership of websites to the Chinese cluster based on their level of cultural proximity. In the 
section that follows, where we report our findings, we also describe these analytical procedures in 
greater detail. 
Analysis and Results 
Analyzing Global Online Audience Flows 
As already stated, we conceptualized the audience duplication matrix as a network with the 
973 websites as the nodes and % of unique users of total Internet users who visit both websites as 
the ties. However, since any two websites are expected to have some amount of audience overlap, 
we considered a tie to exist only when the duplication was above what one would expect by random 
chance. For instance, if in a given time period, a certain website ‘A’ has a unique user reach of 10% 
of all Internet users and website ‘B’ has a reach of 50%, then assuming the consumption of both are 
independent events, 5% would be the expected number of users to visit both A and B. For all such 
pairs, we considered a tie only if the observed duplication was greater than the expected value. 
Hence the value of ties in the network is the greater than expected duplication between websites. For 
some measures we used dichotomized ties, where we considered the presence of a tie as ‘1’ and 
absence as ‘0.’  
Having obtained this network, we first performed some descriptive analysis to ascertain its 
overall structure. We conducted these analyses as the level of the whole network as well as for 
individual nodes. We first report some aggregate measures for the whole graph. Clustering coefficient 
(varies between 0 and 1) indicates the average tendency of any three nodes in the graph to form a 
triangle (i.e. a connected triad). A high value of this measure suggests that a network is composed of 
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communities with high interconnectivity within the communities and low connectivity between 
them. For this graph, we found clustering coefficient to be quite high (0.846 unweighted and 0.752 
weighted, network density =0.395). These suggest that websites cluster into groups in a manner 
where all sites belonging to the same group have high audience duplication between them and 
websites belonging to different groups have relatively low duplication between them. A visual 
inspection of the websites also confirmed the presence of sharp clustering where websites in the 
same language or those that cater to the same geographies seemed to cluster together (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2 about here 
Identifying Culturally Defined Markets (CDMs) 
Since this audience duplication network suggested the presence of tightly knit clusters both 
by visual inspection and by network analytic measures, we performed a hierarchical clustering of the 
audience duplication matrix. We used the greater than expected duplication as the measure of similarity 
between websites. In other words, the greater the percentage of shared audiences between two 
websites above the expected duplication, the closer we considered them to be. We obtained a 
number of solutions as common in hierarchical clustering procedures. Based on the dendogram, we 
chose the one with 37 clusters, although many of these clusters were single websites or pairs of 
websites which bridged these clusters. Aside from these bridges, which we explain later, we were left 
with 953 websites (out of 973 in our sample) that clustered into 18 communities.   
These communities conform well to our definition of culturally defined markets, or CDMs, 
as websites clustering together are either in the same language or those that cater to the same 
geography, and at times share both language and geography. The largest of these clusters contains all 
the websites dominated by audiences from the English speaking countries such as United States, UK, 
and Australia. Even many global websites with content in multiple languages (such as Facebook and 
Twitter), mainly owing to their large user-base in the US and UK, are a part of this cluster. The 
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second largest cluster is of websites focusing on Chinese-speaking regions, including sites in both 
traditional and simplified Chinese. Likewise we observed many more such culturally defined clusters, 
which we list in Table 1 with further information on the languages and/or geographical focuses of 
their constituent websites.  
The other possible solutions (based on the dendogram) also revealed clusters along geo-
linguistic lines. A solution with a smaller number of clusters combined sites from Japan, Indonesia 
and Thailand with those from the UK and US. Another solution with a larger number of clusters 
resulted in more than 200 clusters. Both these solutions were not conducive to our intended level of 
analysis, which is to analyze behaviors across countries.     
Table 1 about here 
At first glance, it is tempting to interpret that these clusters are essentially a manifestation of 
the language of the websites, but language provides only a limited explanation. For instance, our 
fourth largest cluster, while dominated by French language websites, also has Arabic Websites (from 
Morocco, Egypt and pan-regional sites such as Arabic Wikipedia and Arabic Yahoo) and hence is 
more appropriately interpreted as a cluster of websites centered on the Francophone culture. 
Likewise all India-focused websites, although in English, segregate into a cluster of their own and 
not with other English language websites that focus on the UK and USA. An exception to our geo-
linguistic clusters is a cluster of sites focusing on football (soccer). A further analysis of what 
explains membership to each cluster is outside the scope of this paper, but our analysis of the 
Chinese cluster (Cluster No. 2 in Table 1, henceforth referred to as the “C-Cluster”) that follows, 
would shed light on other clusters as well, as we expect that similar factors to explain membership to 
each CDM 
Many of the 20 sites that did not go into any of these clusters are actually sites that bridge 
these clusters. In network analytic terms, these bridging nodes appear on a large number of shortest 
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paths from any node in the network to any other node. In this website audience duplication 
network, such websites are accessed by audiences from more than one CDM. Indeed they included 
content neutral platforms like file sharing platforms, as well as large technology companies such as 
Windows Media Player, Acrobat, and Intel, whose many language / country specific websites are 
part of the same domain. 
Relative Isolation of Culturally Defined Markets  
The first impression figure 1 may convey that the WWW is composed of two communities: 
the China and the World. Access blockage may seem the most obvious reason behind this isolation 
of the Chinese Websites. However, this CDM is most salient on the visualization simply because 
China has the largest online population; also 190 websites (out of 973) target China, the largest for 
any country in our sample. To confirm this intuition, we computed a measure of isolation based on 
the group closeness centrality of each of these CDMs (Everett and Borgatti 1999). This group level 
measure indicates the average distance of the shortest path between nodes in this CDM, considered 
as a group, to all other nodes in the network outside of this CDM. For instance, a CDM with sites 
that shares audiences with all other sites in the network will have a closeness of 1, as it is only step 
removed from all other nodes. The higher the closeness centrality the more isolated we regard the 
CDM from the rest of the WWW. 
We report the isolation (based on the measure of group closeness centrality) in Table 1. As 
one would have expected the Global CDM is the least isolated cluster. The Indian CDM is a close 
second, which is not surprising as the Indian sites included here have English as their primary 
language. The Chinese CDM is among the clusters with relatively low isolation, and its score is 
nearly equal to that of the Japanese CDM. In fact most linguistically determined CDMs are more 
isolated than either the Chinese or Japanese CDMs. In particular the Turkish, Korean, Vietnamese, 
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Italian and Polish CDMs are the most isolated clusters in that order. In general both language and 
geographic focus of the websites appear to contribute to the isolation of a CDM. 
C-Cluster as the Chinese CDM on the WWW 
The C-Cluster consists of 194 websites, most of which are in simplified Chinese language, 
with the remaining handful of sites operating in traditional Chinese. Compared to Chinese-language 
sites outside, such as the Chinese version of many multinational corporate websites, members in the 
C-Cluster tend to carry information or services with distinct “Chinese characteristics.” For example, 
music sharing sites feature Chinese artists, social networking sites build around Chinese schools and 
companies, online stores deliver to Chinese cities, and news portals monitor the ups and downs of 
Chinese territories. Here a complete spectrum of websites covers all aspects of everyday life, 
including 33 information portals/search engines, 26 online services such as thematic discussion 
forums and resource sharing sites, 24 websites providing multimedia entertainment, 20 gaming sites, 
18 retail shopping sites, 7 social media sites, and 6 websites run by traditional news media. It is not 
difficult to imagine Internet users to comfortably inhabit such a self-sufficient virtual world. 
An interesting observation from the graph (Figure 1) is the nature of sites within the C-
cluster that connect it with the rest of the network. Among such sites the most salient bridge is 
alibaba.com, a China-based online business-to-business trading platform for small businesses. 
Boosted by China’s manufacturing capacity and being the largest of its kind, it attracts visitors 
worldwide. More intriguing, however, are the other bridging sites, including the Chinese Wikipedia. 
Unlike in other CDMs, where Wikipedia tends to have its various language versions occupy the 
center, its Chinese domain is pushed to the boundary possibly due to a lack of China-originated 
participation. Also serving as bridges are several Hong Kong and Taiwanese sites, most of which are 
blocked by the Chinese government, as well as quite a number of mainland China-based 
entertainment sites, including video/music sharing platforms and online gaming portals.  
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We further wanted to examine how cultural proximity and access blockage each explain 
whether a site becomes a part of the C-Cluster. To examine this we classified websites by four levels 
of cultural proximity. We label the sites in the Chinese (simplified or traditional) as their principal 
language and focus on China as their main geography as having the highest cultural proximity. 
Baidu.com and Weibo.com are examples of such sites. Next we label sites with Chinese as their main 
language and Hong Kong or Taiwan as their focal geographies as those with ‘high’ cultural 
proximity. Wretch (a popular blogging platform in Taiwan) and Yahoo Hong Kong are examples of 
sites in this category. The next category of sites which we label as having ‘low’ cultural proximity are 
those that have Chinese as one of their many languages and Greater China as one among the many 
geographies they cater to. Examples of such sites are ‘global’ sites BBC and Wordpress.com. The 
last category, with ‘lowest’ cultural proximity, comprises of sites that neither focus on China nor are 
available in the Chinese language.  
In Table 2 we report the number of websites that make it to C-Cluster from each of these 
levels of cultural proximity (in rows). In each of the cells, we also report the percentage of sites that 
are blocked. The C-Cluster includes both blocked and unblocked sites. Of its 194 sites, 189 focus on 
mainland China, only 2% of which are blocked, and 4 sites focus on Taiwan and Hong Kong (‘high’ 
cultural proximity), 3 of which are blocked. The sites that are culturally distant in general don’t 
group with other sites in the C-Cluster. Among the multilingual websites (that have Chinese 
language versions) with a global focus, only 2 websites (Xinuhuanet.com and CNTV.com) out of 
106 group with the C-Cluster. Of the other 105 websites in this category that do not make it to the 
C-Cluster, 25 are actually blocked. Finally, none of the least culturally proximate sites are members 
of the C-Cluster.  
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Tables 2 about here  
Discussion 
Our study questions the widely held assumption that access blockage results in an isolated 
Chinese Internet from the so-called globalized WWW. We conceptualized the WWW as a network 
of shared audiences between websites, and find that, rather than one globalized completely 
connected community, the Internet manifests itself as a collection of many Culturally Defined 
Markets, China being one of them. A closer analysis of the Chinese CDM suggests that cultural 
proximity has a greater role than access blockage in shaping online user behavior. In this section, we 
discuss the implications of our key findings. 
First, these CDMs are essentially communities of websites that share either language or 
geographical focus and often both. The C-Cluster is one such community and is quite similar in its 
composition of websites to other CDMs such as Japan, South Korea, and Russia. Each CDM is a 
self-sufficient set with a wide variety of websites to satisfy the diet of typical Internet users. In 
particular, we find that the C-Cluster is not restricted to mainland Chinese sites, but also includes 
websites from Hong Kong and Taiwan. This configuration echoes what the scholarship on regional 
cultural markets refers to as “Greater China,” “defined by the [political, cultural, and economic] 
interactions among its three primary constituent parts” (Chan 2005, 174). 3 
Second, we find that cultural proximity rather than blockage explains the membership to the 
C-Cluster. As Table 2 reveals, this cluster is largely made up of the most culturally proximate sites 
(i.e., sites in Chinese focusing on China) and few such sites are blocked. It also includes all Hong 
Kong and Taiwan focused sites, despite the fact that the GFW blocks most of them. The effect of 
the GFW is less clear among websites that have Chinese as one of the languages and a “Global” 
geographic focus. Of them, the two sites that group with the C-Cluster are Chinese state-run news 
agency and television network, each attempting a global audience. Among the non-members in this 
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category, nearly one fourth are blocked. It is possible that some could have made it into the C-
Cluster were it not for the GFW. Blocked sites such as Facebook and YouTube are after all used by 
the Chinese diaspora. However, several cases suggest that the amount of coercive intervention by 
the GFW is rather limited. For example, before it finally withdrew in 2010, Google unsuccessfully 
struggled against Baidu for two years for a share of the Chinese search engine market. Also, 
although the GFW blockage on the Chinese Wikipedia was lifted in 2008, its users continue to be 
predominantly from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Chinese diaspora. The mainland Chinese have 
instead stayed with Hudong and Baidu Baike, two local analogues of Wikipedia that emerged during 
the latter’s absence (Ng 2013).       
Third, we find that the Chinese CDM is not more isolated than other CDMs. Notably, as 
indicated by the closeness centrality scores (Table 1), we find that countries allowing much more 
“open” WWW both in Asia (e.g., Japan) and elsewhere (e.g., Germany and Italy) (Freedom House 
2013) constitute CDMs that are just as isolated from the rest of the WWW as the Chinese CDM. In 
other words, our findings suggest that “the Balkanization of the Internet,” as warned against by 
many (Goldsmith and Wu 2008), is driven primarily by cultural diversity, whose impact is, when 
applicable, only enhanced by national filtering. Therefore, the prominent narrative about a state-cast 
“digital curtain” fracturing global flows of Internet communication is highly problematic; Internet 
blockage like China’s GFW should not be the sole focus when assessing a nation’s virtual habitat on 
the WWW.    
Our findings then raise the question: Does this mean that, in terms of actual use patterns, 
the Chinese are not particularly parochial because of the GFW? The three mechanisms that bridge 
the C-Cluster and the rest of the WWW provide some insight. First, certain relatively cosmopolitan 
users from China access both domestic and unblocked foreign sites. Second, many users in mainland 
China visit blocked sites in addition to allowed sites via filter-circumvention techniques. Such 
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practices have their precursors such as picking up of television signal spillovers, music CD 
smuggling, and film piracy, all of which have long persisted and served to undermine Chinese 
government’s restrictions (Chan 2005; De Kloet 2010; Wu 2012). Third, the audience overlap 
between websites in and outside the C-Cluster could also be due to users in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, as well as the overseas Chinese scattered across the world, who frequent mainland Chinese 
sites. The fact that the bridging sites either focus on Hong Kong and Taiwan, or are user-generated 
content sites from mainland China, supports this last explanation. Web usage of the Chinese 
diaspora, the largest and most widely spread diaspora in the world, may also partially explain the 
lower isolation of the C-Cluster.  
To ascertain how much the behavior of each of these audience segments accounts for the 
bridging area wherein websites both in and outside the C-Cluster are visited, data at the respondent 
level is required in order to analyze a two-mode network with both users and websites as nodes. 
Unfortunately, we do not have access to such data, and hence are unable to confirm to what extent 
each of aforementioned mechanisms is at work. Regardless, all these mechanisms suggest that even 
though blockage prevents access to foreign websites, unlike traditional import control, it cannot stop 
cross-border interactions among ordinary people. These interactions between people in and outside 
of China generate a new dimension of cultural flows on the WWW. 
In sum, although the GFW is a form of geographically focused Internet regulation, our 
findings show that it does not create a grand partition between the “Chinternet” from the global 
Internet. Further, our results challenge the predominant discourse in Western policy-making, 
popular media, and oftentimes academic works, which assume the sole function of access blockage 
to be coercive interference in user behavior. 
Based on these findings, it is worth speculating how the lifting of blockage would reshape 
the Chinese CDM. First, it is most likely that the existing websites in the C-Cluster would continue 
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to stick together due to cultural proximity. The major changes would be in the bridging area, which 
contains currently blocked websites from Hong Kong and Taiwan. If these become freely accessible 
to the mainland Chinese, it is reasonable to expect that they would be pulled closer to the densely 
connected mainland sites, as they carry content appealing to China-based users. However, we 
contend that these sites would not become central within the cluster, as they have a strong local 
focus on Hong Kong and Taiwan, and many mainland Chinese may find either their ideological 
overtones unpleasant or their content irrelevant. Even for blocked websites with most culturally 
proximate content, lifting the blockage would not lead to dramatic changes in their locations. For 
example, as already noted, after four years of blockage and made accessible again in 2008, the 
Chinese Wikipedia has failed to accumulate a significant user base in China (Ng 2013). We also 
expect that the C-Cluster as a whole would move closer to the rest of the WWW, as more Chinese 
would participate in global social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Nonetheless, 
a distinct Chinese CDM would remain as do its Japanese, Russian, and South Korean counterparts, 
because users consume culturally proximate content, with or without access blockage. Therefore, 
compared to removing the GFW of China, on which most policy, popular, and scholarly discourse 
tend to concentrate, battling against content censorship over domestic websites may bring about 
much more substantial changes in what Chinese people make use of on the Internet, which may 
enable further cultural changes. 
Finally, we emphasize a sociological approach when examining government control over 
Internet use in the form of access blockage. Such an approach departs from normative prescription 
ingrained in classical liberalism (Cramer 2013). It regards Internet use as cultural consumption 
situated in specific social conditions. Research on China’s film import controls has seen a similar 
shift where controls were first conceived as ideological maneuvers, then also as cultural 
protectionism, and finally as one factor amid many in the complex dynamics of Chinese pirate film 
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consumption (Wu 2012). Studies on state censorship in other nondemocratic contexts also advocate 
empirical interrogations (e.g., Abramitzky and Sin 2010). Our study extends this stance. We 
demonstrate that Internet blockage should not be taken readily as external coercion against certain 
hypothetically autonomous and normatively anticipated behavior; instead, it should be investigated 
as one of many structural aspects that shape media choices. 
 
                                                          
1 This information has been taken from comScore's own documentation on methodology that is 
only available to subscribers.  
2 The methods GreatFire uses for detecting GFW blockage are explained at 
https://en.greatfire.org/faq.  
3 To clarify, our approach aims to describe and analyze existing CDMs, while refraining from 
reifying a unified cultural logic behind identified CDMs. For instance, by illuminating the 
existence of a Chinese CDM, we do not imply about “Chineseness” or a possible realization of a 
“Chinese civilization-state” (Cf. Tu, 2005 [1991]). 
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Figure 1 Internet Access Blockage and User Behavior 
a. Extant view: User choice based on access 
 
b. Proposed view: User choice based on cultural proximity * 
 
b1. t = around 2001: imposition of blockage 
 
 b2. t = 2012: after years of persistent blockage 
 
b3. What if blockage is lifted today? 
 
* Blocked websites are far less in proportion than commonly implied in the dominant discourse. See our data 
analyses that follow. 
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Figure 2 Visualization of Culturally Defined Markets3 
  
                                                          
3 Each color corresponds to a culturally defined market. See Table 1 for legend.  
NOTE: If  you are reading a black-and-white version, please access the colored version of  both Figure 2 and Table 1 at: 
http://angelaxiaowu.com/files/graph.png. 
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Table 1 Culturally Defined Markets Explained (Cluster Solution) 
Cluster No. No of Sites Language Geography Other 
Characteristics 
Isolation 
1 351 English Global, US, UK, Canada, 
Australia 
 1.05 
C-Cluster; 2 194 Chinese China, HK, Taiwan  1.13 
3 111 Japanese Japan, Global File-sharing 1.14 
4 61 French, Arabic France, the Middle East  1.19 
5 47 Spanish Spain, Argentina, Mexico   1.21 
6 47 Russia Russian  1.22 
7 22 Portuguese Brazil, Portugal  1.21 
8 21 German Germany  1.26 
9 19 English India  1.09 
10 16 Polish, Multiple Poland, Global Sports betting4 1.32 
11 15 Korean South Korea    1.49 
12 10 Italian Italy  1.43 
13 10 Turkish Turkey  1.72 
14 8 English Africa, Global Social networking5 1.27 
15 6 Vietnamese Vietnam  1.43 
16 5 Bahasa, Thai Indonesia, Thailand  1.31 
17 5 Multiple Global Soccer / Football 1.21 
18 3 Dutch The Netherlands  1.40 
                                                          
4 Sports betting is legal in Poland. 
5 These are second tier (excluding Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn) social networking sites and have a 
disproportionately large number of  users in African countries. This could be because they need lower bandwidth 
than most others.  
NOTE: If  you are reading a black-and-white version, please access the colored version of  both Figure 2 and Table 1 at: 
http://angelaxiaowu.com/files/graph.png. 
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Table 2 C-Cluster Membership  
 
No. of Websites (% of these websites blocked from access in China) 
* “In Chinese” refers to websites that offer content in the Chinese language, simplified or traditional. 
 
 
Classification of Website Cultural Proximity 
Chinese Cluster 
Non-Member Member 
In Chinese* and China Focus Highest 0 (0%) 189 (2%) 
In Chinese and Taiwan & HK Focused High 0 4 (75%) 
In Chinese but Global Focus Low 105 (24%) 1 (0%) 
Neither in Chinese nor Greater China 
Focused Lowest 674 (10%) 0 
Total Number of Websites  779 (12%) 194 (4%) 
